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This work-in- progress document contains results of a research analysing 
outward FDI in financial services from Hungary between 2001 and 2014. 
We identified the main foreign investor companies, of which one is a Hun-
garian-controlled, majority foreign-owned bank and a local subsidiary of a 
German bank. The paper examines in detail the foreign investment activi-
ties of the leading investors and changes in it during the crisis. The meth-
odology applied is detailed case studies of the main investor banks, based 
on semi-structured interviews with leading managers as well as other in-
formation collected from specialised newspapers and journals and the 
bank balance sheets. On the basis of these, Hungarian OFDI in financial 
services is analysed, regarding the main ownership advantages of inves-
tors, their motivations to invest, the entry mode chosen, the geographic lo-
cations of the investments, the strategy settings of the companies and the 
home country impact of outward FDI.  
1. Introduction 
Outward foreign direct investments (OFDI) increased substantially from former transi-
tion economies after the start of the transition process. Hungary was among the 
frontrunners in OFDI in this country group, starting to invest abroad considerable 
amounts from the mid-nineties. (Kalotay, 2002; Antalóczy and Éltető, 2002) At the 
end of 2012, the stock of Hungarian OFDI amounted to more than 26.5 billion euros, 
which is the second largest behind Poland among the new member states of the Eu-
ropean Union. In per capita terms, only Estonia and Slovenia have higher OFDI than 
Hungary in the same country group. 
Hungarian OFDI is concentrated in a few sectors, partly in connection with the largest 
transactions connected to a few companies. (Sass, Kalotay, 2010) Thus it is highly 
concentrated in terms of the investing companies. According to the data of the Hun-
garian national bank, the outstanding sectors are mining, in manufacturing: oil, phar-
maceuticals and electronics and in services: financial services, professional and oth-
er services (mainly business services). Thus the high concentration in terms of the 
investors is connected with the sectoral composition of OFDI. The leading sectors 
are: financial services (20% of total OFDI, with OTP Bank as the most important out-
ward investor), mining and quarrying and manufacturing of refined petroleum prod-
ucts (18%, connected to the activities of MOL) and pharmaceutical industry (6%, 
mainly Richter). OFDI in financial services has represented a significant part of mod-
ern Hungarian OFDI (Gál, 2006; Antalóczy and Sass, 2008; Sass, Kalotay, 2010; 
Sass et al., 2011), though its absolute values had been relatively small: it surpassed 
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the half a billion euro stock only in 2000, but afterwards it grew dynamically to exceed 
a stock of 3 billion euros by the end of 2009. At the end of 2009, it represented 23.5 
% of total Hungarian OFDI, being the leading services sector in terms of OFDI. By 
the end of 2012, the OFDI stock in financial services increased to more than 5 billion 
euros, a significant increase from previous year. (Direct comparison with develop-
ments before 2008 is not possible because of the change in methodology in sectoral 
data collection.) 
Similarly to total OFDI, financial OFDI is highly concentrated in terms of the number 
of significant investors (Gál, 2010): according to our estimation, OTP represents the 
overwhelming majority of investments abroad in the sector, while a small share (an 
estimated 100-200 million euros) was taken up by MKB until 2014, thus 2012 data 
contained the foreign investment of this bank.1 The third investor is also small, the 
formerly OTP-related OTP Garancia, operating in investment services may be re-
sponsible for the majority of OFDI in that sector, amounting to a stock of 26 million 
euros in 2009. OTP Garancia was acquired in 2008 from OTP by the French 
Groupama and thus this company inherited an office in Slovakia. 
 
Table 1 Outward FDI (stock) in Financial activities, 1998-2009 (million euros) 
  
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Monetary 
activities 
57.7 67.6 48.3 86.7 127.9 182.1 295.2 1600.9 2075.7 1702.7 1991.3 2158.0 
Other 
financial 
activities 
249.0 326.8 529.8 583.3 565.0 835.6 775.1 442.7 518.4 163.5 616.7 886.3 
Insurance 0.4 0.3 0.3 - 6.1 13.3 17.4 12.0 20.3 86.6 25.6 26.9 
Total 307.0 396.6 605.4 670.7 731.0 1056.6 1087.8 2080.7 2614.8 1996.9 2650.1 3086.7 
Note: equity, reinvested earnings and other capital; stock; NACE’03 
Source: Hungarian National Bank 
Table 2 Outward FDI (stock) in Financial and insurance activities, 2008-2012 (million 
euros) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Financial 
intermediation 
  2 547,5    2 655,9    2 947,8    2 607,9    2 215,8  
Insurance 
  12,6    12,3    18,5    14,1    25,2  
Total 
  2 577,5    2 689,7    2 990,2    2 644,5    5 312,5  
 
1 As we will see later, MKB sold its Bulgarian subsidiary bank in August 2013, see e.g. 
http://www.standartnews.com/english/read/bulgarias_first_investment_bank_acquires_local_subsidia
ry_of_hungarian_mkb-290.html and its Romanian subsidiary bank in January 2014, see e.g. 
http://www.romania-insider.com/mkb-bank-sells-romanias-nextebank/112265/ 
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Note: NACE’08 
Source: Hungarian National Bank 
The relative importance of OFDI in financial services in Hungary has changed con-
siderably over time compared to other new EU members, in which OFDI is signifi-
cant. Financial services was the dominant sector compared to the Visegrad econo-
mies before the crisis (Sass and Radlo, 2011). However, this has changed 
considerably over the crisis years – as in all other countries in the region. (Table 3) In 
2012, Hungary had the third highest share of financial services in overall outward FDI 
stock among the analysed countries 
Table 3 Share of Financial intermediation in total OFDI stock, %, selected econo-
mies, 2008 and 2012 
 2008 2012 
Czech Republic 7.3 62.3 
Estonia 37.1 9.3 
Hungary 16.6 20.0 
Poland 25.1 30.1 
Slovakia 17.5 6.5* 
Slovenia 18.2 10.2 
Memo item: Austria 31.0 24.9 
Source: OECD International Direct Investment Statistics 2014, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-
and-investment/oecd-international-direct-investment-statistics_2307437x 
Note: data for 2011 
In spite of the decline in relative significance of Hungary as an outward investor in 
financial services, the main investor, OTP Bank is still the only significant regionally-
controlled player in that area together with the Polish PKO Bank. (Raiffeisen Re-
search, 2015) Other banking players in the region are coming from Western Europe-
an countries (and smaller projects appear from Russia). Thus increasing outward FDI 
from other countries of the CEE region in Table 3 may be mainly of indirect nature. 
The paper is organised as follows. After presenting the theoretical framework, the 
main aim of the research and the methodology used are shown. The next section 
provides information about the two main foreign investor banks in Hungary. This is 
followed by the analysis of their outward investments in various areas (indirect versus 
direct investors, ownership advantages, strategy, motivation, entry modes, choice of 
location, impact of/on the home economy; and the impact of the crisis). The last sec-
tion concludes. 
 
2. Financial OFDI and multinational banks – 
theoretical framework  
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The emergence of multinational banks can be explained using the theory of multina-
tional enterprises. Thus banks may have different motivations when expanding 
abroad. Due to the nature of bank activities and the relative fragmentation of markets 
(due to national regulations), the most important motivation can be to access new 
markets (especially in relation to developments in the domestic market), thus the 
market-seeking motive dominates. Furthermore, banks can improve their efficiency 
through lowering costs or increasing revenues, or through economies of scale and/or 
scope, thus the efficiency-seeking motive may also be relevant. Furthermore, banks 
can gain important strategic assets and can diversify risks through their foreign ex-
pansion, thus the strategic asset seeking motive may also be relevant. 
This paper uses Dunning’s extended OLI framework for analysing the process of the 
internationalisation in the financial services sector. According to the OLI-framework, 
the investors must own an ownership advantage, which is based on intangible assets 
in order to be able to move abroad. Ownership advantages enable the foreign bank 
to compete with local banks in spite of its “liability of foreignness”. On the other hand, 
this intangible asset may be used by the bank by keeping it inside the organisation 
and not “putting it to market forces”, i.e. not to sell it on the market (internalisation 
advantage). This type of advantage in banking is usually connected to information: 
for example, a cognitive imperfection (Dunning (1981) and stems from the im-
portance of the flow of information between the bank and the client, which is made 
mainly through personal contacts. Thus banks may follow their (important) clients to 
foreign countries – or vice versa. In their most updated form (Dunning- & Lundan, 
2008), ownership advantages can be divided into asset-based advantages (Oa) such 
as cutting-edge technologies, marketing prowess or powerful brand names, and 
transaction-based advantages (Ot) such as common governance of assets and inter-
action with other corporate networks. From this it can be deducted that transaction-
based ownership advantages are indirectly shaped and influenced by the home-
country business and regulatory environment and culture. Furthermore, the locations 
of the investment must possess some specific advantages in order to be able to at-
tract these investments (locational advantages). Empirical research shows that loca-
tion-specific advantages such as size, human capital and cultural distance, do pro-
vide an explication of the internationalization of financial firms. (Outreville, 2007) 
Another theory of “stages internationalisation” is used to some extent, when describ-
ing the geographical spread of the investments. According to the stages approach, 
which is described in detail in the Uppsala model, companies go through different 
stages of internationalisation. The first stage is the ad hoc export, the second is sys-
tematic exporting through an independent foreign sales firm, in the third stage a for-
eign representative company (for sales) is established, and in the fourth stage, a for-
eign production unit (affiliate) is established. (Johansson, Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; 
Johansson, Vahlne, 1977) In the stages approach, a determining role is played by 
the decision taking capacity of the management, which is determined by available 
information, knowledge and experience. The Uppsala model underlines the im-
portance of continuous learning based on foreign experiences, and thus how the 
stages are built on each other. Moreover, the importance of psychic distance is em-
phasized, thus in international transactions cultural, language and other differences 
act as barriers to the flow of information and thus the decision taking capacity of the 
company. Parallel with the increase in foreign experiences of the company, this psy-
chic distance decreases. 
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3. Research question and methodology 
The main aim of the present paper is to describe developments in Hungarian OFDI in 
financial services. On the basis of the analysis, we can relate the characteristics of 
Hungarian OFDI in the financial sector on one hand to the theories and empirical 
findings of multinational companies and banks and emerging multinational compa-
nies and banks. The main areas where the foreign expansion of Hungarian banks are 
analysed will be the following: direct versus indirect investors, ownership advantages, 
strategy, motivation, entry mode, choice of location, impact of/on the home economy 
and impact of the crisis.  
The research is based on semi-structured, questionnaire-based interviews with lead-
ing managers of the two leading foreign investor banks in Hungary. Two interviews 
were conducted with the representatives of the two banks back in 2011 and another 
one with the representative of OTP Bank in 2015. The interviews were based on the 
same semi-structured questionnaire. Besides information from these interviews, data 
from the balance sheets of the companies and specialised journal and newspaper 
articles and texts of interviews with the CEO of OTP Bank were also used. This 
methodological approach can be justified by the extremely low number of important 
investors in financial services in Hungary, and thus the high concentration of invest-
ment in terms of investors. Furthermore, “qualitative research” could also be carried 
out using this method, which may supplement well and even correct results gained 
from quantitative analysis. 
4. A short presentation of the two leading in-
vestors: OTP and MKB  
4.1. OTP 
OTP Bank, is Hungary's leading commercial bank. The legal predecessor of OTP 
was established in 1949, which was a nation-wide state-owned bank specialised in 
retail banking. In 1990 it became a public company and non-banking activities were 
separated. At present, OTP is the determining financial institution in Hungary as far 
as retail banking is concerned; in retail deposits it commands a market share of 
around 32%. Its share in the mortgage loan market is also above 30%. It is a market 
leader also in consumption loans (over 10% share) and the other loans category 
(over 20%). (Molnár, Holló, 2011) It owns the highest number of ATMs and branches 
in Hungary. Its market share is estimated to reach 19.3% in Hungary, according to 
Raiffeisen Research (2015). 
The privatisation process of OTP Bank was launched in 1995. It was privatised 
through the stock exchange, in three “tranches” (1995, 1997 and 1999). As a result of 
three public offerings along with the introduction of the bank's shares into the Buda-
pest Stock Exchange the state's ownership in the bank decreased to a single voting 
preference (golden) share. Individual foreign shareholders were limited to 5 %, and 
domestic shareholders to 10 %. By the end of the decade, the bank's privatization 
had been completed and nearly all of OTP's shares had been placed on the Buda-
pest exchange. In 2008, OTP sold one of its subsidiaries: the French Groupama  
S.A. acquired its insurance business line, OTP Garancia. At the same time, Groupa-
ma S.A. has acquired 8% of shares of OTP Group. Currently the bank is character-
ized by dispersed ownership of mostly private and institutional (financial) investors. In 
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March 2015, 60.06 % was in the hand of foreign investors. Above 5 % was held by 
Megdet, Timur and Ruslan Rahimkulov (8.88 %), the French Groupama (8.29 %) and 
the Hungarian petrol company, MOL (8,57 %) as well as the Lazard Group (5.1%). 
The state owned 5.03 % (until 2007: a golden share); through the Hungarian National 
Asset Management Inc. Employees of OTP held 1.24 %.2  Thus while the majority of 
OTP’s shares are held by foreigners, they are widely dispersed, with no controlling 
shareholder, and Hungarian shareholders are also numerous and none of the foreign 
or domestic shareholders own more than 10 per cent of the shares. Due to the regu-
lations of the banks, none of the above 5% owners have more than 10% of the voting 
rights. 
OTP started its “shopping spree” in the region after its privatisation was finished in 
2001, when it acquired IRB in Slovakia. At present has foreign operations in Roma-
nia, Slovakia, Croatia, and Bulgaria (where its subsidiary, DSK Bank, has become 
market leader), in Russia, Serbia, Montenegro and Ukraine. In 2008, OTP sold its 
insurance company to the French Groupama, and together with that, foreign affiliates 
in insurance in Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria were also sold. In terms of market 
shares, the Montenegrin bank is a market leader, and the Bulgarian bank also has a 
relatively high market share: almost 14 per cent and is a market leader in the country. 
In other countries, the local subsidiary of OTP is of minor importance with 0.4 to 3% 
market shares, with significant operations only in certain niche segments. (Raiffeisen 
Research, 2015) Altogether, it has 11.9 million customers in the region and thus it 
can be regarded as one of the leading banks of the region.3 The bank’s total em-
ployment in 2014 was almost 36000 persons.  
 
4.2 MKB 
 
MKB (Magyar Külkereskedelmi Bank, Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank) was estab-
lished in 1950 for managing currency transactions connected to foreign trade. In 
1987, with the introduction of the two-tier banking system in Hungary, it became a 
universal bank with extending its operations. Its privatisation process took place be-
tween 1994 and 1996. In 1994, Bayern LB (25%) and EBRD (16.7 %) gained minori-
ty share. In addition, in 1994, the Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesell-
schaft (German Investment and Development Society) acquired 8.3 % of the shares. 
In 1996, BayernLB bought an additional 25.8 %. Through further acquisitions and 
increases in the base capital, Bayern LB became the main owner. At present, it is 
owned by Bayerische Landesbank, München, Germany (89,89%) and P.S.K. Be-
teiligungsverwaltung GmbH, Vienna, Austria (9.77%).   
In 2011 it was among the leading banks in Hungary, especially in corporate lending 
and corporate deposits. It was market leader in factoring (25.3% market share) (Mol-
nár, Holló, 2011). However, the bank made considerable losses during the last years 
of its Hungarian operations. 
 
2 See https://www.otpbank.hu/portal/en/IR/Shares/OwnershipStructure 
3 https://www.otpbank.hu/portal/en/AboutUs/History 
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In terms of acquisitions, at first it acquired a domestic bank: Konzumbank in 2003. In 
2005, the first foreign acquisition of the affiliate was realised in Bulgaria, where it ac-
quired the majority of the shares of Unionbank, and in 2006, Romexterra Bank in 
Romania was bought. The acquisition price was not disclosed in neither cases. 
The parent bank, Bayerische Landesbank incurred large losses during the financial 
crisis because investments into sub-prime mortgage securities in the US. One of the 
conditions of the following government bailout set by the relevant authorities of the 
European Union in 2012 was to sell the Hungarian subsidiary, MKB Bank before 
2016.4 Before that, as it was already mentioned the two foreign banks owned by the 
Hungarian affiliate were sold.  
MKB was sold to the Hungarian government for 55 million euros, and the parent 
wrote off 270 euros loans given to the subsidiary. Before selling it, the parent had to 
cut-up the Hungarian subsidiary bank and separate bad loans.  
5. Various characteristics of financial OFDI 
from Hungary 
As it was already pointed out, the two most important investors in financial services 
are OTP and MKB, they are responsible for the overwhelming majority of outward 
FDI in the sector. OTP Garancia, the insurance company was part of the OTP Group, 
when it realised its foreign direct investments, thus the characteristics of its OFDI are 
the same as those of OTP. The French Groupama took over OTP Garancia in 2008 
together with its foreign affiliates in Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria and kept the 
Slovakian subsidiary, while sold the others.  
As far as the timing of OFDI in financial services is considered, OTP was the first to 
start its acquisition in Slovakia. The abrupt impact of the financial crisis is apparent 
from Table 4.  
 
Table 4 Timing and geographical locations of investments by OTP and MKB 
  
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2013 2014 
OTP Slovakia Bulgaria Romania Croatia, 
Serbia (1) 
Serbia (2), 
Ukraine, 
Russia, 
Montenegro 
Russia Slovakia, 
Romania, 
Bulgaria 
 Romania 
entry 
mode 
Privat. Privat. Acqu. (from 
Turkish 
owner) 
Privat. all acqu. Acqu. 
(local) 
selling 
Garancia 
(insurance) 
to Groupa-
 Acqu. 
(Portuguese 
owner) 
 
4 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-24/bayernlb-to-sell-mkb-bank-to-hungary-for-74-
million 
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ma with the 
subsidiaries 
MKB    Bulgaria Romania (HAA)- - Bulgaria Romania 
entry 
mode 
   Acqu. Acqu. (failed 
acqu.) 
- selling local 
subsidiary 
selling local 
subsidiary 
Source: own compilation based on www.mkb.hu and www.otp.hu 
The following areas and characteristics of the foreign expansion of the two banks will 
be analysed in this section: direct versus indirect nature of the foreign investment and 
foreign investor; ownership advantages and strategy; motivation; entry mode; choice 
of location; impact of/on the home economy and the impact of the crisis.  
4.1. Indigenous versus indirect investors 
It is important to distinguish between direct and indirect investors. Direct investors 
are domestically owned firms, while indirect investors are local affiliates of foreign 
parents. On the basis of the short descriptions of the banks it is obvious, that basical-
ly all OFDI from Hungary in the financial services sector can be evaluated as indirect, 
because both investors are in majority foreign ownership. However, it is important to 
note the difference between the two cases. In the case of MKB, it is obvious, that the 
bank is controlled by its major investor. If we simply take the level of foreign owner-
ship at face value and equal it with the level of foreign control, then also OTP should 
be considered a foreign controlled bank. (This is the approach taken for example by 
Altzinger et al. (2003) or Rugraff (2010), where an above 50 % foreign ownership is 
taken as foreign control.) But while OTP is majority foreign owned, it is obviously not 
foreign controlled: it is not the foreign owner but the mainly Hungarian management 
which is taking all strategic decisions, including foreign acquisitions. In the senior 
management (CEO and 6 deputy CEOs) and the members of the Board of Directors 
(3 executive and non-executive members) there are no foreign citizens; nor are there 
any foreign managers reporting directly to the executive director. The official lan-
guage of the company is Hungarian. Thus OTP while on paper it is majority foreign-
owned, all decisions of strategic importance are taken by the Hungarian manage-
ment residing in Hungary, including strategic decisions concerning among others for-
eign investments. Therefore, while the company can be classified as an “indirect” 
investor, due to the foreign majority ownership, we would rather call it qualifyingly a 
“virtual indirect” investor, because there is no single (or an identifiable group of) for-
eign investors holding a clear majority. (Sass et al., 2011) 
“Virtual indirect” investments understandably are much closer in many characteristics 
to direct than to indirect investments. The most important distinguishing factor be-
tween “virtual indirect” and direct investments can be the higher exposure to risk in 
the case of “virtual indirect” investors, because they are more dependent on for-
eign/international capital and they are therefore more directly dependent on changes 
in the business environment in more than two countries. In the case of direct inves-
tors, it is understandably mainly the home and the host countries’ business environ-
ment which has a direct influence on the decisions and operation of the parent com-
pany. For “virtual indirect” investments, there can be further influencing factors in 
terms of the third country which acts as a mediator in the investments and/or further 
countries from which significant holders of shares are present in the ownership struc-
ture of OTP. In that case a minor influence can be attributed mainly to the French 
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Groupama, which operates in a similar sector as OTP. However, its voting rights are 
limited. Otherwise we could say that direct and “virtual indirect” investors are very 
similar to each other.  
Why is it important to distinguish “virtual indirect” from indirect investments? (For 
more details see Sass et al, 2011). First, the motivations of investing abroad may be 
different in the case of indirect and “virtual indirect” (or direct) investments. Motiva-
tions usually partly reflect the relative competitive advantages of the home and the 
host countries. Thus in the case of the “virtual indirect” investments, the competitive 
advantages of the “real” home country must be taken into account. Second, their im-
pact on the home country can differ from each other to a great extent, for example 
this has clear consequences for profit repatriation, transfer of capital, which again is 
realised between the host and the “real” home country. Third, the sustainability of 
foreign investments, the footloseness of the investor company can also differ in the 
case of indirect and “virtual indirect” investors. As Rugraff (2010) points out, the out-
ward FDI path of a given country may prove to be unsustainable or highly sensitive to 
strategic business decisions taken in another than the immediate home country of 
the investment in the case of indirect investments. This may result also in a high 
volatility of both inward and outward investments. OFDI realized by foreign affiliates 
residing in Hungary may prove to be more footloose than those realized by local in-
vestors, as the strategy of the multinational is determined by the parent company re-
siding in a different country. However, in the case of “virtual indirect” investments, the 
home country where these decisions are taken, where the parent company is resid-
ing and the business environment of which influences to a great extent these deci-
sions equals to the immediate home country of the investing company. Thus the high 
presence of “virtual indirect” investments in itself does not necessarily increase the 
volatility of OFDI. 
Fourth, policy implications may also differ in the two cases. Governments of countries 
which are home to big multinationals support their “fellow country companies” espe-
cially of large size or if they are deemed to have strategic importance in their foreign 
operations through lobbying and exercising political influence. In that case, clearly, 
the ultimate investor matters. In the case of “virtual indirect” investors, the ultimate 
investor country equals to the immediate investor country. Fifth, statistical and data 
collection considerations can also be important. The presence of “virtual indirect” in-
vestors may result in false estimations of direct investments abroad; see e.g. 
UNCTAD (2006), p. 108. 
 
4.2. OA/intangible asset and strategy 
Foreign expansion through FDI is always connected to greater risk than domestic 
activities, including possible factors which cannot be managed on the basis of expe-
rience gained in the country of origin. Thus the bank needs special resources in order 
to be able to internationalise successfully. It is important to see what are those intan-
gible assets or competitive advantages which enable these banks to successfully 
enter a new market and efficiently compete with incumbent banks. Such ability can 
stem from specific human and financial resources at hand, banking techniques, spe-
cific banking experiences, organisational skills, skilled personnel, etc. (Mutinelli, Pis-
citello, 2001) 
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The Hungarian economy provided a special business environment for OTP to be able 
to internationalise. The presence and operation of international competitors occurred 
the first here as Hungary was the first among transition economies to privatise banks 
to foreigners. With the appearance of ‘Western-style” banking, existing, non-
privatised banks had to face an increasing level of competition. Hungary was the first 
among former transition countries to open up its economy to FDI, including FDI in the 
banking sector. This has resulted in improved service and products for local affiliates 
of multinationals and also for Hungarian firms, together with the introduction of inno-
vative financial products to the Hungarian consumer, such as consumer credits. (Ak-
bar, McBride, 2004) Both the method and the timing of privatization matter to perfor-
mance; specifically, voucher privatization does not lead to increased efficiency and 
early-privatized banks are more efficient than later-privatized banks. (Bonin et al., 
2005) These factors all played a role in shaping the ownership advantages of OTP. 
In 1992, Sándor Csányi, was appointed chairman and CEO of OTP Bank, who with 
his management team started to reorganise and modernise the operation of the fi-
nancial institute in this increasingly “market-like” business environment. By the end of 
1994, OTP had reduced the number of managers from more than 200 to 65, and 
many of these were replaced by young, talented managers. The bank slashed more 
than 8,000 jobs by the end of the decade. It centralised its back-office operations and 
developed and introduced its own IT. It was the first to appear on the Hungarian mar-
ket with novelties such as debit cards, mobile telephone banking services, and Inter-
net banking services. Its dominant position in Hungary and the successful reorgani-
sation of activities resulted in strong capitalisation, which made OTP an attractive 
target for acquisitions. This push factor together with the accumulated knowledge 
about restructuring and operation in an evolving market economy environment in-
duced the bank to carry out its first foreign acquisition in a neighbouring country with 
a significant Hungarian minority population, in Slovakia. It also played a role in further 
acquisitions. This type of ownership advantage could result in successful foreign ac-
quistions only around until 2005, because after that there were no privatisation-
related “target-banks” in the region. Dynamically, by that time, OTP could change its 
ownership advantage and rely more on its knowledge about operation in an evolving 
market environment and it could move in and specialise in certain market niches in 
its foreign operations, especially in countries, where it had only a very low local mar-
ket share.  
In the case of MKB, the “story” is completely different. The German parent bank real-
ised the opportunities the region had to offer already at the beginning of the years 
2000. It had an unsuccessful attempt at acquiring a bank in Croatia, where there 
were management errors as well. After that, in 2005 a decision was taken, that with 
close parent control, the Hungarian bank, the management of which is much more 
familiar with both the region and the modus operandi in it, will be responsible for the 
acquisitions in the region. The parent bank made the final decision and looked for 
possible target banks as well. The parent selected the target countries, which were 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia on the basis of having there close 
Hungarian ties. Another reason why the Hungarian subsidiary was selected was that 
foreign acquisitions would target retail and SME banking, in which the Hungarian 
subsidiary had considerable experience (the parent dealt mainly with large-sized cli-
ents). (Connected to that the Hungarian subsidiary launched a new retail model in 
Hungary in 2005.) At the end, MKB acquired two foreign banks, the original target 
was more, but in Serbia, they were outpriced by Greek banks, then the crisis made 
further acquisitions impossible and the parent even had to sell its Hungarian subsidi-
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ary, as we shall see later. Thus the ownership advantages of the Hungarian subsidi-
ary again are connected to a special (local/regional) knowledge, which the parent 
bank does not own. 
According to the theory, certain ownership advantages of firms or banks follow rather 
than lead internationalisation, because they may pursue asset seeking strategies 
before converting to market seeking ones. It may also happen that assets and mar-
kets are sought for simultaneously. In the case of OTP and MKB, we could not see 
this type of changes. 
 
4.3 Impact of/on the home economy 
Impact of the home economy is especially important in the case of OTP in shaping 
the (initial) ownership advantages of the bank, thus providing it with transaction-
based advantages. First, the mode of privatisation gave an opportunity and resulted 
in the experience for the management to be able to privatise and restructure formerly 
state-owned banks. Foreign expansion based on that experience than was the basis 
for gaining further experiences in the various stages of the post-transition business 
environment. The mode of privatisation acted as a kind of push factor because being 
on the stock exchange and having strong capitalisation made OTP an easy target of 
acquisition, and thus induced the management to strengthen its position by foreign 
expansion. 
Impact on the home economy: according to all the interviewed experts, this is mini-
mal, a minimally positive impact is provided by slightly higher employment. Synergies 
and thus decrease in costs are minimal. Centralisation of certain back office activities 
was of very small size in the case of OTP, thus resulting in a small increase in em-
ployment. The indirect impact of making the bank more stable due to foreign opera-
tions and the possibility of financing home country losses from the gains abroad may 
be more important, especially that in Hungary the banking sector is put on high bur-
dens from 2010 on. 
 
4.4 Motivations 
The motivation in both cases is clearly market-seeking, the efficiency-seeking motive 
is not present. First of all, representatives of both banks said that their main targets 
are local customers, as the representative of MKB put it: “90% of customers is com-
pletely local”. During the interviews, none of the interviewed bank representatives 
deemed it important that there would be significant benefits from synergies or econ-
omies of scale and scope. OTP Bank made an attempt to centralise a few back office 
activities, but it was not possible for all the subsidiaries due to local regulations pro-
hibiting the transfer of customer data abroad. In a few cases, there were common 
purchases of inputs (e.g. machinery, software), but this is also more an exception 
than the rule as the experience is that affiliates could attain better bargains locally. 
There are a few examples of sharing best practice in key activities, such as risk 
management, and new product development and allocating funds effectively, which 
is important for catching-up and remain competitive in international markets, but 
overall, the local subsidiaries are basically independent. 
 12 
An interesting case is the motivation to follow important clients abroad – either by the 
bank or by its customers. According to the interviews, in the case of OTP, in coun-
tries, where its market share is small and operates mainly in niche-markets, that is 
true only for certain activities, but the bank could not become a primary bank for 
these important Hungarian foreign investor companies (e.g. MOL, Richter). However, 
it is not their primary bank neither in Hungary. In the case of MKB, the “follow” client” 
motivation was present for some smaller Hungarian companies, and for certain Ger-
man ones, but in the latter case, this was not automatic, the local subsidiaries had to 
contact those German companies, which were present locally. In terms of the motiva-
tions of the banks to go where important investor companies from their own home 
countries are present, was not the case. 
 
4.5. Entry modes and choice of location 
 
As far as the entry modes are concerned, emerging multinational banks are more 
inclined to set up small ventures in “unknown” territories, even in the form of green-
field investments. (Petrou, 2007) On the other hand, in the banking sector, acquisi-
tion is the main entry mode, as it provides ready assets, knowledge, reputation, ac-
cess know-how in technical areas, and gives an “easy way” to increase size 
(Dunning, Lundan, 2008). In the case of the two Hungarian investors, acquisitions 
either from foreign or local owners, or from the state (privatisation) are the dominant 
entry modes in countries, which are geographically and culturally very close to Hun-
gary. As we saw, in the case of OTP, its competitive edge laid in the capacity and 
ability to transform formerly state-owned, uncompetitive and overstaffed banks into 
competitive ones. Thus until 2005, privatisation-related acquisition was the main en-
try mode. Even for greenfield purposes, acquisitions are used, as was the case when 
OTP acquired a Romanian bank “for the licence”, as its previous and later attempts 
proved to unsuccessful in acquiring a larger Romanian bank in the framework of pri-
vatisation. Later on, as the ownership advantages of OTP changed and as privatisa-
tion targets disappeared, OTP’s entry mode changed to acquisitions. On the other 
hand, for OTP Garancia the entry modes were mainly through greenfield invest-
ments, connected to the local affiliates of the OTP Bank, low investment requirement 
makes possible a greenfield entry. For MKB Bank, both foreign banks were acquired 
independently of privatisation (and the failed attempt was also an acquisition). 
As far as the geographic locations of foreign investments are concerned, both banks 
concentrate on their immediate regions. One common reason for that is the relatively 
low physic distance. For OTP, according to the interviews conducted with the repre-
sentatives of the bank, when it acquired the Slovakian bank, one of its aims was to 
serve local Hungarians. A similar goal was to be achieved in Romania, and to a less-
er extent, in Serbia, where the affiliate is headquartered in Novi Sad (in Hungarian 
Újvidék) – with a Hungarian minority population. (In all these three countries, there is 
a Hungarian minority population of considerable size.) However, according to the in-
terview, at present Hungarians are clients of the local OTP affiliate in greater propor-
tion only in Romania. The second common reason for the two banks is the low psy-
chic distance due to common socialist heritage and the common elements of the 
consequent transition process. These banks have a competitive advantage due to 
their knowledge about how a “socialist bank” operated and how to transform it into a 
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competitive Western type bank. This obviously played an important role in the case 
of the Bulgarian bank bought by OTP, according to one interview, this bank was the 
equivalent of the Hungarian OTP in Bulgaria and due to the later start of Bulgaria in 
the transition process, OTP could use all its accumulated knowledge there. In the 
case of MKB, according to the interview, after some failed attempts of acquisitions in 
the region, the German parent bank decided to rely on the knowledge and experi-
ence of the Hungarian subsidiary, and thus it was assigned the responsibility for the 
takeover of the Romanian and Bulgarian banks. Thus especially in the case of OTP, 
internationalisation is obviously taking place in “stages” (Johansson and Vahlne, 
1977), in terms of going from one location with a lower physic distance to another 
one to a higher one and so on. In the case of OTP, confidence and experience 
gained in geographically closer countries provided the basis for changes in intangible 
assets and thus in ownership advantages and enabled the bank to access further 
markets with higher psychic distance, as for example Russia. 
 
4. 6 The impact of the crisis 
As we could see in Table 4, the crisis brought considerable changes for both banks: 
it first stopped their acquisitions in the region. (On the other hand, acquisition targets 
were missing, and the existing ones were too expensive reflecting the local problems 
of banking in the countries of the region.) The crisis induced OTP to sell the insur-
ance arm and around 8% of its shares to the French Groupama for around 600 mil-
lion euro – this helped OTP to weather the crisis and the consequent negative 
changes in the Hungarian banking environment. OTP could not really restart its re-
gional expansion since the crisis, it was first in 2014, when further acquisition of 
shares in a partly-owned by OTP bank in Romania was announced. However, even 
that transaction was of minor importance in terms of its value.  
In the case of MKB, the parent bank had to sell its Hungarian subsidiary already dur-
ing the crisis, due to fulfilling a condition of its bailout by the German government car-
ried out in 2008. Because the bank could not have been sold in one part, the German 
parent bank, Bayerische Landesbank first induced the Hungarian subsidiary to sell 
the two affiliates: the Bulgarian one in 2013 and the Romanian one in 2014. Later on, 
the Hungarian subsidiary itself was sold to the Hungarian state for 55 million euros in 
July 2014.5 The transactions resulted in relatively large losses for the German bank, 
however, that was the condition of the bail-out posed by EU antitrust rulings. Thus 
MKB Bank ceased to exist as a multinational bank during the crisis – and due to cri-
sis-related developments in the parent bank. 
 
5 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-24/bayernlb-to-sell-mkb-bank-to-hungary-for-74-
million 
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6. Conclusion and further research 
The paper examines in detail the foreign investment activities of the leading investors 
and changes in it during the crisis. The methodology applied is detailed case studies 
of the main investor banks, based on semi-structured interviews with leading manag-
ers as well as other information collected from specialised newspapers and journals 
and the bank balance sheets. As far as the preliminary results are concerned, we 
distinguished indirect and virtual indirect investors: while OTP Bank is foreign majori-
ty owned, the strategy of the bank is determined by its controlling owner(s), which are 
the members of the Hungarian management due to the dispersed ownership struc-
ture (no foreign investor has more than 10 %). On the other hand, MKB Bank was a 
100% foreign-owned bank with a German owner in the pre-crisis period, the im-
portant role of the Hungarian management is also shown when determining the for-
eign investment strategies of the Hungarian subsidiary. Thus, while the two cases 
would be clearcut cases of indirect investments, their closer analysis reveals im-
portant “deviations” from the textbook case. 
In terms of the ownership advantages (OA) of the banks, we show the direct (MKB) 
and the indirect (OTP) connection between inward and outward FDI in terms of ena-
bling the banks to develop their own OAs with experience in privatisation and restruc-
turing of formerly state-owned banks and with learning how to operate successfully in 
a developing market economy environment with numerous competitors. We show 
that their motivation to invest is mainly market-seeking. Entry modes are acquisition 
in certain cases related to privatisation. In location choice, the importance of psychic 
distance is underlined in a wide sense (including a slightly belated progress com-
pared to the home country towards the establishment of a market economy). We 
show the impact on the home economy being minor mainly in terms of benefitting 
from synergies, small employment creation in the parent bank and profit repatriation 
helping the parent bank (OTP) during the crisis. The direct impact of the crisis is 
shown for the performance of the banks and their internationalisation strategies and 
its indirect impact on changes in the ownership structure of MKB. 
Further research is needed in terms of relating the characteristics of foreign expan-
sion of the two banks to those of developed country banks and emerging multina-
tional banks and to show the unique features of the former. Furthermore, the level of 
success of foreign subsidiaries needs to be analysed in order to assess the success 
of foreign expansion. 
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